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Dunn: Montgomery v. Louisiana

MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA: AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE A PRACTICAL
IMPOSSIBILITY
Erin Dunn*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case Miller
v. Alabama,1 which held that mandatory life in prison without parole
for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment,2 even in homicide cases.3 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, courts across the
country were left to decide if this ruling applied retroactively to all
prisoners facing a mandatory life sentence for a homicide committed
as a juvenile.4 Notably, the highest courts in Louisiana, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Minnesota held Miller is procedural and, therefore,
should not be applied retroactively.5 However, nine states held the
rule from Miller is substantive and therefore does apply retroactively.6
As a result of the split among the states, the Supreme Court

*
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1
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
3
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
4
Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 967, 968 (2015).
5
Id. at 968, 971.
6
Id. at 968 (explaining Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Iowa, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Illinois, Wyoming, and Texas have all held Miller is retroactive).
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granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana7 in order to decide
whether Miller should be applied retroactively.8 The Supreme Court
announced its decision on January 25, 2016, holding the new rule
from Miller is substantive and, therefore, is not subject to the general
bar on retroactivity for cases on collateral review.9
Over 2,000 people currently serving a mandatory sentence of
life in prison without parole for a homicide committed before they
were 18 years old will be affected by this decision. 10 Several states
have hundreds of prisoners that now must be resentenced.11 For instance, Pennsylvania alone has 482 prisoners.12 Even more, many of
these cases were sentenced decades ago, with some even dating back
as far as the 1950s.13 Resentencing hundreds of inmates will prove to
be problematic for many of these states because the facts needed for a
discretionary sentencing hearing were not recorded at the time of the
initial sentencing.14
The Supreme Court acknowledged this issue in its decision
and explained that states do not need to resentence everyone, but
could consider these inmates for parole instead; however, the states
7

135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015).
Montgomery v. Louisiana Question Presented, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/1400280qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). This is the second time the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to decide this particular issue. In 2014, the Court granted certiorari in Toca v. Louisiana; however, the case was dismissed when the defendant was released early
from prison after receiving a new plea deal. 141 So. 3d 265 (L.A. 2014), cert. granted in
part, 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014) and cert. dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015); Lyle Denniston, Juvenile Sentencing Argument Expanded, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2015, 3:11 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/juvenile-sentencing-argument-expanded/ [hereinafter
Denniston, Argument Expanded].
9
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 718, 732 (2016).
10
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, 38, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)
(No. 14-280) [hereinafter Transcript]; Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and 15 Other
States in Support of the Respondent at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)
(No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief of Other States]; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Considers
Reprieve for Kids who Kill, USA Today (Oct. 11, 2015 9:48 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/10/11/supreme-court-juvenile-lifewithout-parole-murder/73594976/.
11
Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13-15.
12
Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13. Additionally, Michigan has 368 prisoners
and Louisiana has 202 prisoners who must be resentenced. Id. at 14-15.
13
Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 4, 13-15; Wolf, supra note 10. In fact, Pennsylvania has an inmate who was sentenced to life in prison without parole following a 1956
murder. Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 13. In Louisiana, one inmate who was sentenced to life in prison without parole committed murder in 1958. Id. at 15.
14
Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 9.
8
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must address the sentence to ensure the prisoner is not serving a disproportionate sentence.15 Despite the imposition on the states, the
Court made clear that “[t]here is no grandfather clause that permits
States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.”16 Therefore,
a sentence is void even if the sentence was finalized before the Supreme Court held the specific type of sentence was unconstitutional.17
Overall, the Court made the correct decision in Montgomery;
however, the Court was intellectually dishonest in its analysis. In its
opinion, the majority found Miller to be retroactive by rewriting the
holding.18 Even worse, the Court could have come to the same conclusion without conducting an intellectually dishonest analysis. The
Court was swayed by its dislike for juvenile life without parole sentences and the majority tried to make the sentence difficult to impose.
This comment asserts the majority had a specific outcome it wanted
to reach and tailored its opinion in order to reach that holding.
This comment will explore the Supreme Court’s decision in
Montgomery. Section II will explore the Court’s decision in Miller.
Section III will analyze the doctrine for applying a new rule retroactively as set forth in Teague v. Lane.19 Section IV will analyze the
Court’s decision in Montgomery and the accusations raised by the
dissent. Finally, Section V will show how the majority was intellectually dishonest and how it was actively trying to make juvenile life
without parole practically impossible.
II.

MANDATORY LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR
JUVENILES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Court in Miller, by a 5-4 decision, banned mandatory life
in prison without parole for any juvenile offense.20 This decision by
the Supreme Court invalidated the sentencing schemes in the majority of the states and even the federal government.21
15

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
Id. at 731.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
20
Sara L. Ochs, Miller v. Alabama: The Supreme Court's Lenient Approach to Our Nation's Juvenile Murderers, 58 LOY. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2012). .
21
Id. at 1074. Twenty-nine jurisdictions allowed for mandatory life without parole for
juveniles at the time. Ioana Tchoukleva, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between
16
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Miller and its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,22 each involved a 14 year old who was sentenced to life in prison without parole following a murder conviction.23 In Arkansas, Kuntrell Jackson
was charged as an adult for felony murder after a co-defendant shot
and killed a store clerk while three boys attempted to rob the store.24
Jackson discovered his co-defendant had the shotgun on the way to
the store, and while he initially decided to stay outside, he did go into
the store while the robbery was in progress.25 There was a dispute as
to whether Jackson actually knew the other boys were planning to rob
the store at gunpoint and actively took part or thought the boys were
joking.26
In Alabama, Evan Miller was charged as an adult, convicted
of murder, and mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.27 One
night, after smoking marijuana and drinking with a friend and a
neighbor, Miller tried to steal money from the neighbor’s wallet after
he passed out.28 The neighbor woke up and an altercation ensued.29
In the end, Miller hit the neighbor repeatedly with a baseball bat.30
Miller then covered the neighbor with a sheet, said, “I am God, I’ve
come to take your life,” and then hit him one more time.31 Miller and
his friend eventually set fire to the trailer to destroy any evidence of
the crime; the neighbor died from smoke inhalation.32 Following a
mandatory sentence to life in prison without parole, both Miller and
Jackson argued their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution based on the reasoning in Roper v. Simmons33 and Graham v. Florida.34
Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 97 (2013).
22
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
23
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461-63.
24
Id. at 2461.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 2462-63.
28
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty for anyone under the age of 18 years old
violates the Eighth Amendment).
34
560 U.S. 48 (2011) (holding juvenile life in prison without parole for a non-homicide
offense is unconstitutional); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461, 2463.
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The Court looked at the Eighth Amendment, which states,
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”35 In its interpretation
the Court explained that the “prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’ ”36 The Court explained that a punishment must be
proportional to the defendant and the crime because “proportionality
is central to the Eighth Amendment.”37 Further, proportionality is
examined by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”38
Alabama and Arkansas opposed the imposition of individualized sentencing for juveniles facing life without parole.39 First, the
States argued the new rule established by the majority conflicted with
Eighth Amendment case precedent.40 In Harmelin v. Michigan,41 the
Court had upheld a mandatory life without parole sentence. The
Court explained “that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual” does not “become so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’ ”42
The States argued prohibiting mandatory life in prison without parole
overrules Harmelin.43 However, Harmelin itself did not involve a juvenile nor did the opinion claim to apply to juvenile offenders.44 It is
well established that appropriate sentences for adults may be unconstitutional for juveniles.45 Therefore, the ruling in Miller did not
overrule Harmelin.46
Justice Kagan, who wrote the majority opinion, wove two
strings of precedent together in order to conclude mandatory life
without parole was unconstitutional.47 Specifically, the Court considered Roper and Graham, which both categorically banned a pun35

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190).
37
Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021).
38
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976)).
39
Id. at 2469-70.
40
Id. at 2470.
41
501 U.S. 959 (1991).
42
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. (explaining Roper prohibits the death penalty for juveniles and Graham prohibits
life without parole for non-homicide offenses for juveniles).
46
Id.
47
Tchoukleva, supra note 21, at 96.
36
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ishment for juveniles, and Woodson v. North Carolina48 and Lockett
v. Ohio,49 which held a defendant’s characteristics must be considered before the death penalty can be imposed.50
The Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Roper and Graham, in which it explained that juveniles are different from adults for
sentencing purposes.51 Juveniles tend to be more immature, reckless,
irresponsible, and vulnerable to peer pressure than adults.52 They also have little control over their surroundings and do not have the capacity to extricate themselves from dangerous situations.53 The Court
stated that these traits found in juveniles “diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.”54 Juveniles have the best chance of rehabilitation; however, the
penological justifications for rehabilitation are not served by a sentence of life without parole.55 The differences between juveniles and
adults make them “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”56
Even though the Court in Graham limited its holding to nonhomicide offenders, juvenile traits that lead to crime are not crimespecific.57 In fact, juvenile traits are just as relevant in a robbery that
results in felony murder as they are in a regular robbery.58 The traits
that distinguish juveniles from adults are universal to all juvenile offenders for all crime categories.59 Even more, traits attributed to
youth weaken the justifications for punishment, which in turn may
cause a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile to be disproportionate to his or her crime and status.60
The Court in Miller explained that removing age as a factor
48

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
50
Tchoukleva, supra note 21, at 96.
51
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
52
Id.; Mariko K. Shitama, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the
Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony
Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 836 (2013).
53
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; Shitama, supra note 52, at 836.
54
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (explaining that juvenile life without parole does not satisfy
the theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation).
55
Id. at 2464-65.
56
Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
57
Id. at 2465.
58
Id.
59
Ochs, supra note 20, at 1083.
60
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465-66.
49
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from such severe sentencing procedures “poses too great a risk [a]
disproportionate punishment” will be imposed.61 Age is an important
feature in any Eighth Amendment analysis, especially when considering the proportionality of a sentence.62 It is well established that juveniles are less culpable than adults, and the age of a juvenile offender can play a pivotal role in an Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis.63
Next, Alabama and Arkansas argued a mandatory sentencing
scheme was constitutional because there were many states with similar mandatory schemes in place.64 At the time, there were 29 jurisdictions that had mandatory life without parole schemes for juveniles.65 When considering categorical bars, the Court does consider
whether there is a “ ‘national consensus’ against a sentence for a particular class of offenders.”66 However, the Court distinguished the
Miller case from this line of precedent,67 stating,
[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for
a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example
we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a particular penalty.68
In fact, in Graham, the Court barred juvenile life in prison without
parole for non-homicide cases, despite the fact that 39 jurisdictions
allowed for it.69 Also, in several death penalty cases, the Court
deemed the death penalty unconstitutional for certain classes of people, despite the fact that only a minority of states had chosen to enact
similar statutes.70 Therefore, a “national consensus” does not pre61

Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 77).
63
Id. (discussing Graham, 560 U.S. at 90 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)); see
supra text accompanying notes 51-60.
64
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
65
Id. at 2471.
66
Id. at 2470.
67
Id. at 2471.
68
Id.
69
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
70
Id. at 2472. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court vacated a death penalty sentence for a
15 year old in its plurality opinion, even though only 18 states had a minimum age requirement for the death penalty, all of which had a minimum of 16 years old. 487 U.S. 815, 819,
62
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clude the Court’s holding that mandatory life in prison schemes for
juveniles are unconstitutional.71
Additionally, mandatory death penalty sentences are unconstitutional because they exclude individual characteristics from being
considered.72 By assessing the mitigating factors, only the most culpable will receive the death penalty.73 Mandatory life without parole
for juveniles excludes a sentencing body from considering mitigating
factors, such as age and other traits that accompany age.74 The Court
further explained, “[j]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself
a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be
duly considered.”75 Mandatory schemes even ignore a juvenile’s actual participation in the offense.76 Even more, mandatory schemes
ignore the possibility that a juvenile can be rehabilitated.77 This is
especially important because the “hallmark features” of childhood are
transient.78 Mandatory schemes inherently violate the basic principle
set forth in Graham and Roper, “that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they
were not children.”79
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that mandatory life in
prison without parole is unconstitutional for juveniles because it violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment.”80 Notably, life in prison without parole for juveniles is still
829, 838 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality). In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held the death penalty was unconstitutional for the mentally disabled, even though less than half of the states that
allowed for the death penalty had a mentally disabled exception. 536 U.S. 304, 321, 342
(2002) (Stevens, J., opinion) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). In Roper, the Court held the death
penalty was unconstitutional for juveniles, even though only 18 out of the 38 states that allowed for the death penalty had a prohibition for minors. 543 U.S. at 578, 595 (2005) (Kennedy, J., opinion) (Stevens, J., concurring).
71
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2472 n.11.
72
Id. at 2467.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 2468 (explaining a juvenile may have a dysfunctional home life that he or she
cannot remove oneself from due to his or her age).
75
Id. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982)).
76
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 2467. The “hallmark features” of age include, “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at 2468.
79
Id. at 2458.
80
Miller, 132 S. Ct.at 2460.
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constitutional81 and can still be imposed; only now, sentencing bodies
must consider factors that make juveniles different from adults.82
Even though the sentence is still constitutional, the Court did specify
that life without parole for juveniles should be uncommon.83 This is
due to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish a juvenile with a transient immaturity from one with an irreparable corruption.84
III.

THE RULE FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

The legal principle for when to apply a new rule retroactively
was established by a plurality decision in Teague.85 In this plurality
opinion, Justice O’Connor adopted Justice Harlan’s theory on retroactivity from Mackey v. United States.86 The rule for retroactivity
was later adopted and expanded by subsequent cases, including Penry
v. Lynaugh.87
The plurality in Teague stated that all new rules, either substantive or procedural, must be applied retroactively when a case is
on direct review.88 In contrast, new criminal procedure rules are gen-

81

Id. at 2469.
Id.
83
Id.; Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: A New Look – Maybe – at Life Sentences for
Youths, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2015, 12:22 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/10/anew-look-maybe-at-life-sentences-for-youths/ [hereinafter Denniston, Argument Preview].
84
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
85
Teague, 489 U.S. 288; Brief for Petitioner at 13, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. However, Teague was a federal
collateral review case. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728.
86
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (O’Connor, J., plurality); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667 (1971) (Harlan, J., opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part).
87
492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989) (abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(extending Teague to capital sentencing cases)); Benjamin P. Cooper, Truth in Sentencing:
The Prospective and Retroactive Application of Simmons v. South Carolina, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1573, 1588 (1996); See also Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Saffle v. Parks,
494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. Mckellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Christopher N. Lasch, The
Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why
Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009).
88
Teague, 489 U.S. at 303, 319 (O’Connor, J., plurality, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia,
J., and Kennedy, J. In a concurring opinion Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part,
agreed new rules should be applied retroactively on direct review). “[A] case announces a
new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government.” Id. at 301. A new rule has also been defined as “not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id.
82
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erally not applied retroactively on collateral review.89 This general
bar on collateral retroactivity is due to the fact that a case that follows
the procedures and rules that are constitutional at the time of the decision will generally be found to be fundamentally fair.90 The principle
of finality is fundamental to the criminal justice system and applying
constitutional rules retroactively undermines this principle.91 However, the plurality clarified that “in some situations it might be that
time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of
what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”92
There are two exceptions for when a new rule should be applied retroactively on collateral review: 1) “if it places ‘certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe’ ” and 2) “if it requires the observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’ ”93 The first exception has evolved to distinguish
substantive rules from procedural rules.94 In fact, in Montgomery, the
89
Id. at 303, 319, 320 (O’Connor, J., plurality, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and
Kennedy, J. In a concurring opinion, Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part, stated he
was “persuaded that the Court should adopt Justice Harlan’s analysis of retroactivity for habeas corpus cases as well for cases still on direct review.”). While Justice Stevens agrees to
adopt Justice Harlan’s views, he disagrees with the plurality’s interpretation to the fundamental fairness exception. Id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring). “[F]actual innocence is too
capricious a factor by which to determine if a procedural change is sufficiently ‘bedrock’ or
watershed’ to justify application of the fundamental fairness exception.” Teague, 489 U.S. at
322 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90
Id. at 311 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
91
Id. at 309 (O’Connor, J., plurality). “No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial
system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration
shall be subject to fresh litigation.” Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
92
Id. at 311 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis omitted).
93
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 319-20 (O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J. In a concurring opinion, Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J. in part, agreed to adopt
the retroactivity doctrine but rejected the interpretation of the second exception.); See also
Butler, 494 U.S. at 415-16. Even though the Court in Teague described substantive rules as
an exception to retroactive application, the Court has since characterized substantive new
rules as “not subject to the bar.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at
352 n.4).
94
Moriearty, supra note 4, at 964. The federal government in its brief explained that procedure is how “a case is adjudicated” and substantive is “the possible outcomes of the case.”
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Court even described the first exception as “substantive rules of constitutional law.”95 New substantive rules are retroactively applied on
collateral review because these rules “necessarily carry a significant
risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not
make criminal;’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose
upon him.”96
There are several categories of substantive rules.97 First, substantive rules can alter the conduct criminalized, including changing
the elements of a statute.98 Second, a substantive rule may “place[] a
class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe.”99 Third, a substantive rule prohibits a type of punishment for
a group of defendants based on the crime or their status.100
The second exception only applies new rules retroactively
when the new rule is a “watershed” rule of procedure that undermines
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.101 This exception is limited to new procedures that seriously diminish the certainty of a conviction.102 Procedural rules are generally not retroactive because procedural rules “merely raise the possibility that someone convicted
with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.”103 Procedural rules regulate the manner of determining guilt
or who is making the decision.104 It is still unclear what rules would
be classified as watershed for the purposes of this exception because
the Court has never actually found a rule to be watershed.105
Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83.
95
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728.
96
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
97
Moriearty, supra note 4, at 965. It is important to note that in Montgomery, the Supreme Court explained “[s]ubstantive rules include ‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of
certain primary conduct’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728
(quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330).
98
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353-54.
99
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494.
100
Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.
101
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
102
Butler, 494 U.S. at 416 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13 (O’Connor, J., plurality)).
“[W]e operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt . . . .” Teague, 489 U.S. at 313 (O’Connor, J., plurality).
103
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
104
Id. at 353.
105
Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 28 (2014).
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MONTGOMERY HELD THE PROHIBITION ON
MANDATORY JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
IS SUBSTANTIVE AND RETROACTIVE
A.

MONTGOMERY’S PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 13, 1963, Henry Montgomery, at age 17,
committed murder.106 He murdered a deputy sheriff in East Baton
Rouge, Louisiana107 and was sentenced to mandatory life in prison
without parole following his murder conviction.108 Montgomery’s
conviction became final on March 15, 1971, 44 years prior to Miller.109 At the time of Montgomery’s conviction, the courts did not
consider age and other juvenile traits as a factor for sentencing. 110
Montgomery is 69 years old now and has been in prison since his
sentencing.111
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, Montgomery filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, which the District
Court denied.112 The District Court applied Teague in order to determine if the new rule from Miller should be applied retroactively.113
The District Court found that in order for a new rule to be applied on
collateral review, the rule must fall within one of the exceptions es-

106

Brief of Respondent State of Louisiana at 11, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]; Wolf, supra note 10.
107
Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83.
108
Brief of Respondent, supra note 106, at 11. Montgomery originally received a death
sentence, but it was overturned and he was sentenced to life without parole instead. Wolf,
supra note 10.
109
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455; Brief of Respondent, supra note 106, at 11. Montgomery’s
case became final when the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused to change his sentence.
Denniston, Argument Preview, supra note 83. In fact, a case is considered “final after the
first round of lower court review.” Id.
110
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85, at 12.
111
Wolf, supra note 10.
112
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. 1, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718
(2016) (No. 14-280) [hereinafter Petition for Writ].
113
Id. The State Court chose to apply Teague; however the case Danforth v. Minnesota
held that states do not have to apply Teague. 552 U.S. 264 (2008); Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken, Retroactivity, The Due Process Clause, and the Federal Question in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 43 (2015). In fact, Danforth left it
unsettled whether states must use the exceptions set forth in Teague in a retroactivity analysis. Zarrow, supra note 113, at 43.
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tablished in Teague.114 The District Court explained that Miller did
not fall into either Teague exception because it was neither a categorical bar on a sentence nor a “watershed rule.”115 The court described
the first Teague exception as new rules that remove a specific punishment from the available constitutional punishments for a class of
people.116 The court explained that Miller was not a categorical bar
on life in prison without parole; it only prohibited a mandatory sentencing scheme.117 Therefore, the Miller holding did not fall under
the first Teague exception.118 The court then defined the second exception as “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”119
The court did not explain why the holding in Miller is not a “watershed” procedural rule.120 The court only stated Miller did not qualify
under the second Teague exception.121
Montgomery then applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
a supervisory and remedial writ, which the court granted.122 The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the
Motion to Correct and Illegal Sentence.123 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 23, 2015.124
B.

THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

In Montgomery, the Supreme Court was asked to determine
an issue splitting the state courts: whether Miller should be applied
retroactively to juvenile homicide offenders who were sentenced before Miller was decided.125 The majority started the opinion with a
description of the procedural history in Montgomery and then dis-

114

Petition for Writ, supra note 112, at App. 1.
Id. at App. 2.
116
Id. at App. 1.
117
Id. at App. 2.
118
Id.
119
Petition for Writ, supra note 112, at App. 2.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
State v. Montgomery, 141 So. 3d 264, 264 (L.A. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1546
(Mem) (Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-280).
123
Id.
124
Montgomery, 135 S. Ct. at 1546.
125
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725.
115
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cussed the jurisdictional issue before the Court.126 During the jurisdictional analysis, the Court briefly described the retroactivity law set
forth in Teague.127
As discussed earlier, the Court in Montgomery explained that
there are two instances when a new rule will not be subject to the bar
on retroactivity: when a new rule is substantive and when a new rule
is a watershed procedural rule.128 Here, the Court only listed two of
the categories for substantive exceptions in its analysis.129 Specifically, the Court referred to “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.”130 The Court stated that case precedent explained the Constitution requires new substantive rules to be retroactive because substantive new rules introduce “categorical constitutional guarantees
that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond
the State’s power to impose.”131 Therefore, a state cannot enforce a
sentence that is deemed unconstitutional.132 The Court further clarified that “the use of flawless sentencing procedures” cannot “immunize[] the defendant from the sentence imposed.”133 A sentence that
contradicts a substantive rule is void and a court cannot leave a sentence in place that contradicts a substantive rule, regardless of when
the sentence became final.134 Indeed, the Court further emphasized
this point by stating, “[a] penalty imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional law is no less void because the prisoner’s sentence became final before the law was held unconstitutional. There is no grandfather
clause that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution
forbids. To conclude otherwise would undercut the Constitution’s

126

Id. at 725-32. “[T]he jurisdictional question hinged on whether the Court’s retroactivity precedents are a constitutional mandate.” Miller v. Alabama rule barring mandatory life
imprisonment without parole for juvenile homicide offenders applied retroactively in state
cases on collateral review—Supreme Court Decision, 33 No. 4 WEST'S CRIMINAL LAW NEWS
NL 63 (2016).
127
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728-30.
128
Id. at 728; see supra text accompanying notes 85-105.
129
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728.
130
Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 302, 330).
131
Id. at 729.
132
Id. at 729-30.
133
Id. at 730.
134
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at.731.
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substantive guarantees.”135 Additionally, applying a substantive new
rule retroactively does not undermine the principle of finality because
a state cannot preserve a sentence that is unconstitutional.136
Next, the Court went on to determine if the rule from Miller
was substantive and, therefore, retroactive.137 The Court reiterated
that Miller’s decision was founded on precedent that held particular
punishments disproportionate for juveniles, specifically citing Roper
and Graham.138 The Court explained that, “[p]rotection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the
Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a
defendant’s sentence.”139 The Court emphasized the established
principle that children are different with respect to sentencing and the
penological justifications for sentencing do not justify juvenile life
without parole.140
Even though there may be a “rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity,” the Montgomery Court repeated
the notion that juvenile life without parole should be uncommon.141
Due to this reasoning the Court in Montgomery viewed the Miller
holding as more than a simple requirement to hear juvenile mitigating
factors before sentencing.142
The Court then explained further that simply conducting an
individualized sentencing hearing would not make a sentence constitutional if the crime was a result of transient immaturity in the juvenile.143 In fact, Miller found life without parole an excessive punishment for all juveniles, except for the rare juvenile whose crime
indicated irreparable corruption.144 In view of this interpretation, the
Court found Miller “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional
penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is, ju135

Id.
Id. at 732.
137
Id.
138
Id. (explaining Roper prohibited the death penalty for juveniles and Graham prohibited
juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses).
139
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732-33.
140
Id. at 733.
141
Id. at 733-34.
142
Id. at 734.
143
Id. (“Even if a court considers a child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime
in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’ ”).
144
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
136
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venile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth.”145 Under this classification, the Miller holding fell squarely
within the Penry exception for substantive rules, which mandates retroactivity when a type of punishment is prohibited for a group of defendants based on their crime or status.146 The Court clearly feared
that mandatory life without parole posed too significant a risk that a
juvenile would receive a sentence that could not be imposed on him
or her.147 In fact, the Court found the risk so significant as to find the
“vast majority of juvenile offenders” received a sentence that cannot
be imposed on them.148
The Court acknowledged the problematic quote from Miller
that asserted the decision was not a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles.149 While Miller did not impose a categorical bar
for all juveniles, the Court did find the decision barred life without
parole for any juvenile whose crime did not reflect permanent incorrigibility.150 Indeed, the Court interpreted Miller as drawing a line
between juveniles who are irreparably corrupt and those who were
experiencing transient immaturity.151 Even though life without parole
may be the proportionate sentence for those juveniles who are irreparably corrupt, it “does not mean that all other children imprisoned
under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the deprivation
of a substantive right.”152
Interestingly, the Court conceded that an individualized hearing to present juvenile age factors “has a procedural component” in
response to the Miller Court specifically calling it a process.153 However, a rule that has a procedural component in order to actualize a
substantive guarantee is not the same as a procedural rule under
Teague.154 There are circumstances where a substantive rule requires
145

Id.
Id. at 734; Penry, 492 U.S. at 330.
147
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
148
Id.
149
Id. “Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type
of crime—as, for example we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
150
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. In Miller, the Court stated its holding was not a categorical bar, but “[i]nstead, it
mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . .” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
154
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734-35.
146
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a procedure in order for a defendant to prove he or she cannot receive
a particular sentence.155 For instance, “when the Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment for a class of persons, an affected
prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs to the protected class.”156 A procedural requirement necessary
to facilitate a substantive rule does not turn a substantive guarantee
into a purely procedural rule.157 Here, an individualized sentencing
hearing does not make Miller procedural, but instead gives effect to
the substantive guarantee against a disproportionate sentence, particularly life without parole for juveniles experiencing transient immaturity.158
The Court therefore held that the Miller holding is “a substantive rule of constitutional law.”159 The Court was additionally persuaded to hold Miller is a substantive rule considering the fact that
there is a grave risk that juveniles are unconstitutionally being held
because the vast majority of juvenile homicide offenders received a
sentence that was disproportionate to their crime and status.160
Next, the Court responded to the justifiable concern that applying Miller retroactively would be a burden on the states.161 The
Court clarified that applying Miller retroactively does not require resentencing every juvenile offender who has been sentenced to life
without parole.162 In fact, “[a] State may remedy a Miller violation
by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”163 Allowing juvenile homicide offenders to be eligible for parole protects against a disproportionate sentence because those juveniles whose crimes were an
indication of transient immaturity, and who have matured over time,
will have the chance of freedom.164 Even more,
[e]xtending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders
does not impose an onerous burden on the States, nor
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
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does it disturb the finality of state convictions. Those
prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will
continue to serve life sentences. The opportunity for
release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the
truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who
commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.165
In the end, the Court explained that prisoners must be granted the opportunity to show their crimes were caused by transient immaturity
and not irreparable corruption.166 While the Court did discuss Montgomery’s mitigating factors that may show his crime was caused by
transient immaturity, the Court did not make a final decision as to
whether Montgomery should be released.167 However, it is clear that
if a juvenile offender’s crime were a result of transient immaturity
then he or she must have the chance of leaving prison one day.168
C.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT

Justice Scalia169 wrote a dissenting opinion in Montgomery
and was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito.170 The derisive
opinion makes several accusations, among them, that the majority
rewrote Miller, essentially tried to ban life without parole for juveniles, and made a “Godfather” like offer to the states to make juvenile
homicide offenders parole eligible.171
As noted earlier, the majority described substantive rules as
“categorical constitutional guarantees” that make certain punishments

165

Id.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 736-37.
169
Justice Scalia passed away while this comment was being written. Bridget Mire, Locals remember U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, DAILYCOMET.COM (Feb. 21,
2016), http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20160221/articles/160229966. This dissent in
Montgomery is one of Justice Scalia’s last opinions published. Id.
170
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote a
dissenting opinion in this case, but it will not be discussed in this comment. Id. at 744.
171
Id. at 737, 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). “Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent.”
Andrew Cohen, The Supreme Court May Have Just Granted Thousands of Prisoners a
Chance of Freedom: The Montgomery Ruling Says Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole Must Get a Shot at a New Sentence or Parole, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/25/the-supreme-court-may-have-just-grantedthousands-of-prisoners-a-chance-of-freedom#.RwvMH6lXx.
166
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and laws “altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.”172 Justice
Scalia declared that Miller “simply does not decree” that which the
majority claimed Teague required in order for a rule to be retroactive.173 Justice Scalia then boldly accused the majority of rewriting
Miller to overcome this obstacle.174
Justice Scalia strongly opposed the majority’s finding that
Miller rendered a particular punishment unconstitutional for a certain
class of defendants.175 In his argument, Justice Scalia relied on a specific quote from Miller, which stated, “[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as,
for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s
youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular
penalty.”176 Justice Scalia found the majority’s decision in Montgomery to be a clear contradiction to this explicit statement in Miller.177
Justice Scalia also took exception to the majority’s reliance on
quotes from Miller, which stated juvenile life without parole should
be uncommon and mandatory sentencing schemes posed a significant
risk that juveniles will receive a disproportionate sentence.178 In fact,
Justice Scalia alleged that even if a sentence is “inappropriate and
disproportionate for certain juvenile[s]” it does not mean a sentence
is “unconstitutionally void.”179 The support the majority relied on to
reach its holding actually only shows why the procedure mandated in
Miller is desirable.180 Despite the majority’s reliance on dicta from
Miller, Justice Scalia could not move past the fact that Miller affirmatively stated the holding was not a categorical bar, but a process.181
For a second time, Justice Scalia accused the majority of rewriting

172

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729; see supra text accompanying note 131.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. (quoting Miller, 132, S. Ct. at 2471).
177
Id.
178
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743.
179
Id.
180
Id. (explaining a discretionary sentencing procedure is desirable to deter the imposition
of a life sentence for some juvenile offenders).
181
Id. at 743.
173
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Miller.182 Specifically stating, “the majority is not applying Miller,
but rewriting it.”183
Interestingly, Justice Scalia noted in a footnote that he agreed
with the majority’s first description of the holding from Miller, specifically that a juvenile offender could not be sentenced to life without parole absent a hearing on the juvenile age factors.184 In fact, the
majority initially described the Miller holding as “a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison
without parole absent consideration of the juvenile’s special circumstances . . . .”185 Justice Scalia accused the majority of “softening the
reader with 3 pages of obfuscating analysis” in order to change its
original interpretation of the Miller holding.186
Justice Scalia believed this reinterpretation of the Miller holding has consequences.187 Particularly, if states are categorically
barred from sentencing juveniles who are not permanently incorrigible to life in prison, then the procedure required by Miller may not be
satisfied even when in place.188 The majority asserted in its opinion
that the presence of a discretionary hearing does not allow a juvenile
“whose crime reflects transient immaturity” to receive a life without
parole sentence because this would still violate the Eighth Amendment.189 Justice Scalia explained that “[i]t remains available for the
defendant sentenced to life without parole to argue that his crimes did
not in fact ‘reflect permanent incorrigibility.’ ”190 Now judges are
left to answer the “knotty ‘legal’ question” of whether a prisoner was
incorrigible decades ago at the original time of his or her sentencing.191 Justice Scalia pointed out that Miller required an inquiry into
whether the juvenile was incorrigible at the time of sentencing, “not
whether he has proven corrigible and so can safely be paroled today.”192 In fact, Justice Scalia went on to call this imposition on the
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743.
Id. at 743 n.1.
Id. at 725 (Kennedy, J., opinion).
Id. at 743 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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states silly and impossible.193
Despite this new incorrigibility standard the majority imposed
here, Justice Scalia stated, “[t]he majority does not seriously expect
state and federal collateral-review tribunals to engage in this silliness,
probing the evidence of ‘incorrigibility’ that existed decades ago
when the defendants were sentenced.”194 As mentioned earlier, the
majority suggested states “remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than
by resentencing them.”195 Justice Scalia strongly questioned this
“not-so-subtle invitation” to convert mandatory juvenile life without
parole sentences to parole eligible sentences.196 In fact, Justice Scalia
compared the majority to the “Godfather” and called this ‘invitation’
to the state legislatures, which would allow state courts to avoid the
serious burden of resentencing, an “offer they can’t refuse.”197 This
‘invitation’ by the majority actually led the dissent to believe the entire decision was an attempt to eliminate juvenile life without parole.
In fact, Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]his whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders.”198
Actually, the dissenting opinion alleged the only reason the
majority did not affirmatively ban juvenile life without parole in
Montgomery is to avoid embarrassment.199 Justice Scalia explained
that, in Roper, the Court justified banning the death penalty for juveniles because life without parole was an available and severe punishment.200 Justice Scalia speculated that the only reason the Court did
not affirmatively ban juvenile life without parole is because Justice
Kennedy, who wrote both the opinions in Roper and Montgomery,
would have to contradict the statement that life without parole is a

193

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744.
Id.
195
Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J.,); see supra text accompanying note 163.
196
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197
Id. at 744.
198
Id.
199
Id. (“The Court might have done that [eliminate juvenile life without parole] expressly
(as we know, the Court can decree anything), but that would have been something of an embarrassment.”).
200
Id. “[I]t is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.” Roper, 543 U.S. at
572.
194
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severe enough alternative to the death penalty.201 Due to this, the
Court did not affirmatively prohibit the sentence; instead Justice
Scalia alleged the Court “merely makes imposition of that severe
sanction a practical impossibility.”202
V.

MONTOMERY REACHED THE CORRECT HOLDING
FOR THE WRONG REASONS

Broadly, Miller did create a new procedure.203 In fact, the
majority agreed there was a procedural element, but still found the
holding in Miller to be substantive.204 While a ‘process’ for determining a sentence would be most easily construed as procedural under a Teague analysis, Miller did not slightly alter the existing process but initiated an entirely new substantive standard.205 In fact,
Miller held that state governments could not constitutionally impose
a specific punishment.206 This substantive change caused many states
to enact new legislation in order to prevent unjust sentencing among
juveniles.207 By prohibiting mandatory life in prison without parole,
many states were forced to change their sentencing laws; they did not
simply have to change the process for sentencing a juvenile.208
The majority correctly viewed the individualized sentencing
hearing as a process necessary to actualize a substantive right.209 Indeed, the procedural element in Miller that requires a sentencing
hearing is a direct “result of a substantive change in the law that pro201

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744.
Id.
203
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013).
204
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734, 736.
205
Eric Schab, Departing from Teague: Miller v. Alabama’s Invitation to the State to Experiment with New Retroactivity Standards, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 213, 222-23 (2014).
206
Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts
Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. Law News Now (Aug. 8, 2012, 1:30 PM
CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-withoutparole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/.
207
Schab, supra note 205, at 222-23.
208
Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 33. When the Supreme Court prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles, it required states to “alter and expand the range of permissible punishments” for juvenile homicide offenders. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). Further,
Miller mandated states “offer juveniles at least one sentence carrying the possibility of release, irrespective of ‘the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,’ the decision is
firmly in the ‘substantive sphere’ as defined by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 33.
209
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734-35.
202

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/8

22

Dunn: Montgomery v. Louisiana

2016

MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA

701

hibits mandatory life-without-parole sentencing.”210 Ultimately, Miller altered the range of available sentencing options for juvenile homicide offenders, and any change, whether it be expanding or narrowing, to the criminal punishment options is certainly “a classic
function of substantive law.”211
Actually, a procedure is the only way to ensure juveniles are
not facing a disproportionate sentence when their crimes stemmed
from transient immaturity.212 The majority’s decision to extend Miller retroactively was the correct and fair decision. Refusal to extend
Miller retroactively to all juvenile offenders serving a mandatory life
without parole sentence would be unjust.213 For the juvenile whose
crime was a result of transient immaturity, “[i]t . . . would be terribly
unfair to have individuals imprisoned for life without any chance of
parole based on the accident of the timing of the trial.”214
As noted earlier, the dissent accused the majority of trying to
effectively ban juvenile life without parole.215 In fact, Justice Scalia
proclaimed the entire decision “is just a devious way of eliminating
life without parole for juvenile offenders.”216 While the majority
made the correct decision in the end, Justice Scalia is also correct in
his interpretation of the majority’s motives. The majority was trying
to make life without parole for juveniles practically impossible, if not
eliminate the sentencing option in its entirety.
As explained earlier, the exceptions to the retroactive bar include when a new rule prohibits a specific type of punishment for a
specific class of people.217 The majority found the Miller rule to fall
within this exception, even though it admittedly did not bar juvenile
life without parole for all juveniles.218 The Court, however, still
found the Miller rule to qualify as a Teague exception because “Miller did bar life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibil210

Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115.
Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 33.
212
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.
213
Chemerinsky, supra note 206.
214
State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 508 (Wyo. 2014); Chemerinsky, supra note 206.
215
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744, (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
notes 171, 198.
216
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217
See supra text accompanying note 100.
218
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
211
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ity.”219 This classification by the majority is not in line with the actual holding in Miller.
In fact, Justice Scalia asserted several times that the majority
rewrote Miller in order to reach its ultimate conclusion, and that is
indeed what the majority did.220 As Justice Scalia pointed out, the
majority originally described the Miller holding as a requirement that
sentencing bodies consider the circumstances of youth.221 Then, only
a few pages after the Court initially explained the Miller holding, the
majority stated, “Miller determined that sentencing a child to life
without parole is excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ”222 This new description of the Miller holding is utilized by the majority to fit the holding
nicely into a retroactive application exception.223 The transformed
holding immediately precedes the majority’s explanation that Miller
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class
of defendants because of their status’—that is, juvenile offenders
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”224 It does
appear that the majority was concerned with the outcome of the case
to the point that it essentially made Miller fit into a Teague exception,
even if it meant a new interpretation of the Miller holding.
However, the majority could have reached its conclusion that
Miller is retroactive without changing the holding in Miller. Miller
held that a certain type of punishment, mandatory life without parole,
could not be imposed on a certain class of people, juveniles.225 The
Court should have found Miller retroactive based on ‘mandatory life
without parole’ as the prohibited category of punishment, instead of
finding it retroactive based on juveniles “whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” as a class of defendants.226
Many state courts held Miller was retroactive, and even did so
under the same retroactive exception the Court used, without reinter219

Id.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For instance, Justice Scalia states “the majority simply proceeds to rewrite Miller” and “[i]t is plain as day that the majority is not applying Miller, but
rewriting it.” Id.
221
Id. at 743 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
226
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
220
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preting Miller.227 Several state courts found the category of punishment to be mandatory life without parole.228 For instance, in Massachusetts the court found, “[t]he rule explicitly forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment—mandatory life in prison
without the possibility of parole—on a specific class of defendants:
those individuals under the age of eighteen when they commit the
crime of murder.”229 Also, in Mississippi, the court held “Miller explicitly prohibits states from imposing a mandatory sentence of life
without parole on juveniles.”230
Clearly, the Court could have found Miller a substantive rule
within a Teague exception without having to reinterpret Miller.231 Instead of holding Miller retroactive based on the original interpretation
of the holding, the Court rewrote Miller.232 It is clear that the majority went
beyond the actual scope of the Miller ruling, by
strengthening the chance that a newly convicted juvenile will be able to show, at the time of sentencing,
that he is not beyond rehabilitation to become a lawabiding individual. Life without parole, the Court declared, is always unconstitutional for a juvenile unless
he or she is found to be ‘irreparably corrupt’ or ‘permanently incorrigible.’233
Miller originally held Courts must consider a juvenile’s youth status
before sentencing, which is significantly different from the new
standard requiring sentencing bodies to determine the incorrigibility
of a juvenile.234 By rewriting the holding, the Court imposed a new
227
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss.
2013); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115.
228
Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 105, at 30.
229
Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281.
230
Jones, 122 So. 3d at 702.
231
See e.g., Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 281; Jones, 122 So. 3d at
702; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115.
232
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734, 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences for Youthful Criminals,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
25,
2016,
12:26
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-sentences-foryouthful-criminals/ [hereinafter Denniston, Opinion Analysis].
234
Id.
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difficult incorrigibility standard on sentencing bodies. This reinterpretation of Miller, despite the Court’s ability to apply the decision
retroactively without rewriting the holding, is intellectually dishonest.
As the dissent pointed out, Miller intended for a sentencing
body to determine a juvenile’s incorrigibility at the time of sentencing.235 Now, a prisoner will need to show he or she is corrigible and
will not be a threat to the community if paroled.236
The process of determining a prisoner’s incorrigibility as a
juvenile, and in some instances these cases will date back decades,
may prove impossible.237 In fact, Louisiana said resentencing is impractical because everyone from the first trial is now dead.238 Further, juvenile traits were not recorded at the time of the initial sentencing and would now be impossible to discover.239 Sixteen states,
fueled by their concern, filed an amicus brief arguing, “resentencing
would not reflect Miller at all but would effectively become a parole
hearing.”240
The majority responded to the justifiable concern that resentencing prisoners will be impossible by suggesting “[a] State may
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders
to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”241 Essentially, the Court issued an ultimatum to the states to either make
prisoners who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole as a
juvenile parole eligible, or begin the impossible process of resentencing hundreds of prisoners.
If a state needs to resentence hundreds of prisoners, making
those prisoners parole eligible may be the only way for a state to
avoid a significantly onerous burden.242 Notably, allowing juvenile
homicide offenders to become parole eligible, in place of holding resentencing hearings, can save a substantial amount of money and

235

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
237
Id. (referencing Brief for National District Attorneys Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae at 917, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, (U.S. Aug. 31, 2015). In fact, Justice Scalia even
calls the process of proving a prisoner’s corrigibility silly. Id.
238
Wolf, supra note 10.
239
Brief of Other States, supra note 10, at 9.
240
Id. at 7.
241
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
242
Id. at 736.
236
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avoid lengthy court proceedings.243 The majority’s ‘suggestion’ that
state legislatures enact statutes allowing for parole after a juvenile has
served a specified number of years in prison may be the only option
for many states.244
The majority specifically referenced a statute in Wyoming,
which built in an exception for juvenile homicide offenders allowing
for parole after serving 25 years in prison.245 Wyoming is not the only state to legislatively address the issue of retroactivity. Indeed, several other states also reacted to Miller by enacting statutes that allowed for resentencing after a prisoner has served a specific sentence
length.246 Essentially these statutes require a juvenile homicide offender to have his or her sentence reviewed after a specific term of
years has passed.
The chance to avoid burdensome resentencing hearings by
enacting wide sweeping legislation may be appealing to many
states.247 However, legislative enactments, similar to Wyoming’s,
243
Liliana Segura, Supreme Court Gives New Hope to Juvenile Lifers, but Will States Deliver?, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 26, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/26/montgomery-vlouisiana-supreme-court-gives-new-hope-to-juvenile-lifers-will-states-deliver/ (explaining
the Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights have estimated resentencing hearings will cost $3
million for defense attorneys in the first year alone).
244
Id.; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
245
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301 (c) (2013). “A person
sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the person reached the age
of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term
of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of incarceration . . . .” § 6-10-301 (c).
246
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (2016) (“When a defendant who was
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has served at least
15 years of that sentence, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 4204A (d)(1)(2) (2013) (“[A]ny offender
sentenced to a term of incarceration for murder first degree when said offense was committed prior to the offender's eighteenth birthday shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court
for sentence modification after the offender has served 30 years of the originally imposed
Level V sentence.”).
247
Cristian Farias, Justice Scalia Calls Out a Colleague for Flip-Flopping on Juvenile
Justice,
HUFFPOST
POLITICS
(Jan.
28,
2016,
5:03
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/scalia-kennedy-juvenilejustice_us_56a8ea1fe4b0947efb661ba7 (“Sending all those lifers to the parole board sounds
much easier than trying to conduct proper re-sentencing hearings in so many old cases.”).
After Miller was decided, several states enacted statutes limiting a juvenile’s sentence by
creating the option for parole or resentencing after a specified sentence length. E.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301 (c) (2013); DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 4204A (d)(1)(2) (2013). It is reasonable to expect several more states
will enact similar statutes now that Montgomery has been decided. Following Montgomery,
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would have the same effect as if juvenile life without parole was
eliminated in its entirety.248 By issuing an ultimatum to the states to
enact this type of legislation, the Court clearly preferred juvenile
homicide offenders be eligible for parole and not serve life without
parole sentences. 249 Even though the Court did not affirmatively
eliminate juvenile life without parole, the Court clearly tried.250 It essentially told the states to start the onerous burden of resentencing
hundreds of prisoners or eliminate juvenile life without parole.251
Justice Scalia is correct that the Court had a “devious” plan to
eliminate life without parole for juveniles.252 Justice Kennedy, who
wrote the majority opinion in Montgomery, is the leading proponent
for leniency in juvenile sentencing.253 In fact, Justice Kennedy consistently chips away at juvenile sentencing laws, finding harsh punishments disproportionate and unconstitutional for anyone under 18
years old.254 Clearly, Justice Kennedy’s views on juvenile sentencing
played a crucial role in this decision.255 However, while there was
several states have proposed legislation to change their sentencing laws for juvenile homicide offenders. See, e.g., H.B. 405, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016)(adopted Mar. 25,
2016); H.B 2390, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); S.B. 1147, 200th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016).
248
Notably, the proposed legislation created in the wake of Montgomery effectively eliminates life without parole for anyone under 18 years old. See, e.g., H.B 2390, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (proposing the elimination of life without parole for juveniles); H.B. 405, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016)(adopted March 25, 2016) (proposing the
elimination life without parole for juveniles, which was signed by the Governor on Mar. 25,
2016); S.B. 1147, 200th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2016) (proposing the elimination of
life without parole for juveniles and creating a maximum sentence of 45 years or 35 years
depending on the age of the juvenile).
249
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736, 744 (Kennedy, J., opinion)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
250
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251
Id. at 736, 744 (Kennedy, J., opinion)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
252
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253
Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Parole Rights for Juveniles Sentenced to Life for Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/politics/justicesexpand-parole-rights-for-juveniles-sentenced-to-life-for-murder.html?_r=0.
254
Tamar Birckhead, Will Supreme Court Decision be Death Knell for Life Without Parole, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://jjie.org/willsupreme-court-decision-be-death-knell-for-life-without-parole/179709/.
In fact, Justice
Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in both Roper and Graham. Roper, 543 U.S. at
554; Graham, 560 U.S. at 51.
255
See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide offenders is unconstitutional); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding the death penalty is unconstitutional for juveniles). Justice Kennedy clearly believes juveniles can be rehabilitated
and is committed to protecting juveniles in the court system. Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v.
Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L.
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hope, and even encouragement, that the Supreme Court would hold
life without parole unconstitutional, the Court did not affirmatively
ban the punishment.256 Instead of affirmatively finding juvenile life
without parole unconstitutional, the Court rewrote the Miller holding
to make the sentence a practical impossibility.257
VI.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the awaited decision in Montgomery held Miller is a
substantive rule and must be applied retroactively.258 The Court extended its juvenile sentencing cases, much to the antipathy of Justice
Scalia.259 In fact, the majority interpreted Miller as prohibiting life
without parole for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity, which is not consistent with the Court’s initial interpretation of the
holding.260 This decision was beyond the scope of what Miller actually held.261 This change in the Miller holding introduced a new
standard on state sentencing bodies.262 Now, sentencing bodies must
assess the juvenile’s incorrigibility, which is a difficult standard for
courts to determine.263 Justice Kennedy was clearly swayed by his
strong dislike of harsh punishments for juvenile offenders.264 It is
clear the majority had a specific outcome in mind when it wrote the
opinion, and reached its conclusion by essentially rewriting its holding in Miller.

& PUB. POL’Y 66, 69-70 (2010). Over the last several years, the Court has issued decisions
that called for more lenient juvenile sentencing laws, thanks in part to Justice Kennedy, who
wrote Roper and Graham. Fred Lucas, Going Soft on Juvenile Crime: How the MacArthur
and Casey Foundations Distort Youth Offender Policies, CAPITAL RESEARCH CENTER (May
2013)
https://capitalresearch.org/2013/05/going-soft-on-juvenile-crime-how-the-macarthurand-casey-foundations-distort-youth-offender-policies/.
256
Brief of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and The Criminal
Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Montgomery v. Louisiana,
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280).
257
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258
Id. at 732.
259
Matt Ford, A Retroactive Break for Juvenile Offenders, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/montgomery-alabama-supremecourt/426897/; see supra text accompanying note 171.
260
See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
261
Denniston, Opinion Analysis, supra note 233.
262
Id.
263
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264
See supra text accompanying notes 246-47.
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The Supreme Court’s decision grants thousands of juvenile
homicide offenders the opportunity to have their sentences reheard
and even a possible chance at freedom.265 Due to the large number of
prisoners this decision affects, and the possible burden it will impose
on the states, the Court gave the states an alternative option to resentencing every prisoner.266 In fact, the majority issued an ultimatum to
the states: either judicially resentence every juvenile homicide offender or legislatively convert the sentence to parole eligible.267
Again, it is clear the majority disfavored juvenile life without parole
and would prefer if states eliminated the sentence in its entirety.
Even though the Court conducted an intellectually dishonest
analysis by rewriting Miller in order to hold the decision retroactive,
in the end, the Court made the correct decision. Thousands of prisoners who have been serving a mandatory life without parole sentence will receive the chance to have his or her sentence reviewed. It
would be unjust to have over 2,000 people serve a sentence that, today, is unconstitutional. As the majority pointedly stated, “[t]here is
no grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punishments the
Constitution forbids,”268 and there should not be.

265
266
267
268

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Transcript supra note 10, at 35, 38.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 731.
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